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Abstract 
This is the final report from Loughborough University’s commission from the Institution of 
Civil Engineers (ICE) to carry out an academic evaluation of the applicability and validity of 
the ICE’s 12 Lines of Defence model, produced for infrastructure in response to the Grenfell 
Tower fire. Having reviewed the main report, the interview transcripts and associated 
literature we consider that this adaption of Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model as a basis of the 
Lines of Defence is appropriate, especially as it is well recognised and understood by a wide 
range of stakeholders. This notwithstanding, it does have some deficiencies, and so we have 
proposed enhancements including an integration of post-incident analysis, appreciation for 
crosscutting influencers that could positively or negatively impact every line of defence, and 
a general risk management framework that would act as a context setting for the model and 
ensure that the model can be understood by non-experts, and without specific prior 
knowledge of the industry. The changes have been proposed in order to increase and 
extend the reach of the model, without compromising its recognition and effectiveness.  
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Introduction  
The ‘In Plain Sight: Reducing the Risks of Infrastructure Failure’ interim report has been 
published in 2017. The aim of this document is to provide an academic evaluation of the 
applicability and validity of ’12 Lined of Defence’ model (Figure1). 
 
Figure 1 12 Lines of Defence Model 
The task to Loughborough University comprised the following: 
- In-depth analysis of the report exploring the purpose of the model and its gaps, and 
comparison with existing defence models; 
- A random sample of interviews1 and workshop notes as well as referenced literature 
to inform the model; 
- An initial set of criteria allowing for academic and expert testing of the model.  
The first section of this report describes the process of academic assurance; Section 2 
describes the analysis of the model; and Section 3 introduces the suggested changes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 Due to the relatively small number of interviews (11), all the interview notes were reviewed. 
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1. Methodology 
This section describes the process of academic evaluation and provides an overview of the 
tasks completed during this process. The evaluation process aimed to answer the following 
questions:  
- Why has the Swiss Cheese Model been chosen as a basis for the 12 Lines of 
Defence model? 
- Is the model flexible enough to adjust to a changing context? 
- What are the main influencers that have not been included in the model but could 
increase the holes in the lines of defence? 
- Do layers include conflicting or crosscutting vulnerabilities?  
 
1.1 Review of the literature and interview samples 
The literature used in the report has been grouped in order to understand: what sources 
have been used, when the literature used was published, and what type of publication has 
been used. The results are presented in Figures 2a-2c.  
 
Figure 2a Types of publications (n=47) 
 
Figure 2b Source of publications 
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Figure 2c Date of publication 
The analysis demonstrated that a breadth of literature had been used to inform the ICE 
report; however, literature relevant to other defence models (e.g. Bowtie model) had not 
been included. Other models have been reviewed as a part of the academic exercise and 
are described in more detail in section 2.  
The content of all of the interview notes (11 in total) was also analysed, with the aim to 
identify how the holes in the lines of defence were informed and whether any other holes 
should be included. This is discussed in section 2.1. 
Based on the analysis of other models and primary data, further holes were suggested and 
crosscutting issues identified, leading to proposing slight changes in the model as discussed 
in section 3.  
1.2 Evaluation exercises  
Two exercises have been used to test the viability of proposed changes to the model – an 
academic one (30th April 2018) and an expert one (23rd May). The academic exercise2 
provided an opportunity to review the suggested additional holes and develop the 
crosscutting influencers (Section 3.1) and recommendations.  
The expert exercise aimed at testing whether the crosscutting issues suggested in the 
academic exercise are truly crosscutting. The ICE panel members3 were asked to complete 
an exercise (Appendix A), to understand whether the model supports holistic considerations 
that could help prevent the failure. The experts were also asked to evaluate whether a 
holistic risk identification checklist (section 3.3) is appropriate to aid the understanding of the 
model by those who lack experience in the industry.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
2 The academic exercise was carried out among the authors of this report  
3 The participants of the expert exercise were Peter Hansford, Mike Napier and Matthew Symes  
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2. Analysis of the model 
In recent years, a number of models that attempt to explain the causes of incidents / 
disasters and risk management have been developed (e.g. Petersen, 1996; Loosemore, 
1998; Suraji et al. 2001; Abdelhamid and Everett, 2000). One of the most recognised and 
well-known models is James Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese Model’ (1990). To test the 
applicability of the Swiss Cheese Model proposed in the ICE’s interim report, several other 
models have been reviewed from a theoretical perspective; this has led to the proposed 
incorporation of some of their elements into the Lines of Defence model as follows: 
Bowtie model is a process for understanding the dynamics of potential major accidents. 
The model displays the links between the potential causes, preventative and mitigative 
controls and consequences of a major incident. 
Integrated resilience framework is adapted from ISO 31000 aiming to engage local 
stakeholders (who can typically be disengaged in disaster risk reduction matters) in 
identifying vulnerabilities and improving urban spaces with respect to ‘security threats’. 
Whilst the framework cannot accurately predict every threat or hazard nor provide the 
solution for the prevention or mitigation, it helps the various stakeholders consider prior 
knowledge of existing hazards and threats in a local context and to recognise that, too often, 
disasters occur because risk reduction measures have not been considered or undertaken 
(Bosher 2014; Chmutina et al., 2014).  
2.1 Analysis of the holes (vulnerabilities) 
The analysis of the interviews and academic exercise revealed additional holes, or 
vulnerabilities, that could be considered in the model. It is important to point out that the 
number and types of holes changes constantly, depending on the context in which the model 
is implemented and the stakeholders informing the model. The vulnerabilities presented in 
Table 1 are high-level overarching holes; the third column suggests other potential holes 
developed through the academic workshop exercise but is not an exhaustive list.  
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Table 1 Additional holes for the consideration in the model 
LINES OF 
DEFENCE4  
VULNERABILITIES LISTED IN THE REPORT OTHER POTENTIAL 
VULNERABILITIES 
1.1 Asset 
condition data  
• Older assets 
• Good quality asset data because of the 
fragmentation and evolution of supply-
chain (and thus lack of accountability and 
responsibility)  
• Slow uptake of digitisation, automation 
and remote data sensing  
• Culture (optimisation of assets as a cost, 
not investment) 
•  Barrier to data sharing (e.g. IP) 
• Financial implications for 
collecting info on older assets 
• Conditions of older assets in 
close proximity 
1.2 Incident 
reporting and 
dissemination 
of learnings  
• Lack of collection and dissemination of 
information on failures and near misses 
• Unwillingness to share/ acknowledge 
mistakes 
• Financial disincentives  
• Legal disincentives 
• Lack of leadership in terms of sharing 
failures 
• Lack of environment in which staff can 
speak out  
• Lack of knowledge continuity 
(e.g. due to changes in staff)  
• Lack of information on near-
misses or small failures that do 
not lead to a complete failure 
• Who collects and reports the 
data?  
• Is the information about 
incidents easily accessible? 
• Ignoring other industries  
1.3 CPD  • Weak system of enforcing CPD in a rapidly 
changing context  
• Higher Education  
2.1 Standards 
and regulations  
• Regulation as the final aim rather than a 
process  
• Working to the spirit rather than to the 
letter of a standard 
• Out of date 
• Contradictory to one another and to what 
other industries want   
• Incomplete  
• Replication of standards and 
regulations without proper 
adjustment to a context 
 
2.2 Attention 
to quality in 
design and 
construction  
• Lack of systematic application of the 
concept of inherent safety 
• Lack of safe-life  
• Lack of fail-safe 
• Poor quality construction 
• Poor quality maintenance  
• Focus on personal safety but not on 
quality on site  
• Tolerance to incidences of errors  
• Tolerance of incidences of defects 
• Organisational culture and attitudes 
towards quality  
• Lack of understanding by the importance 
of quality 
 
                                            
4 Numbers in this column refer to the Lines of Defence, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
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LINES OF 
DEFENCE4  
VULNERABILITIES LISTED IN THE REPORT OTHER POTENTIAL 
VULNERABILITIES 
2.3 Suitably 
qualified and 
experienced 
persons  
• Lack of SQEP regime or equivalent  
• Lack of long term management of asset 
integrity  
• Lack of engagement with wider 
range of stakeholders  
• Actions of those not 
appropriately/ professionally 
qualified  
2.4 Code of 
professional 
conduct  
• Growing specialisation of engineering  
• Growing commodification (difficult for a 
client to identify the engineering 
competence that they need) 
• Lack of adherence to the Code  
 
2.5 Client 
organisation  
• Multiple interfaces and handover points 
• Badly executed interface management 
• Badly executed handovers 
• Siloed decision making  
• New or one-off clients/ clients without 
established reputation  
• Budgetary restraints (esp. for one-off 
clients on smaller projects)  
• Lack of clients’ awareness of 
the holes 
• Lack of collaboration among the 
whole team 
3.1 Governance  • Project boards do not act as collective 
decision makers as they may not have 
relevant competencies to make an 
informed decision  
• Lack of a wide range of skills and 
expertise on the board 
• Safety treated as a priority (can change) 
rather than value (stays)  
• Lack of the board’s awareness 
of near misses  
3.2 Investment 
cases and the 
H&S file  
• Lack of demonstration of learning from 
past failures and near misses  
• Safety cases that set out risks and their 
causes are not routine  
• Poorly prepared safety files  
• Not up-to-date safety files 
• Safety files not passed on as part of asset 
handover  
• Organisational culture  
3.3 
Independent 
scrutiny and 
assurance  
• Self-certification 
• Self-accreditation 
• Self-insurance 
• Lack of independent scrutiny at all stages 
of DCOP  
• Rapidly changing context 
• Actions of those not 
appropriately/ professionally 
qualified 
3.4 Asset 
stewardship of 
infrastructure  
• Engineer as a technical advisor rather 
than as a guiding mind 
• Lack of a guardian role  
• Lack of whole operation oversight  
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The identification of the holes revealed some crosscutting influencers that could form a hole 
in every line of defence. These include: understanding of risks; asset handover; skills, 
knowledge, attitude, training and experience (SKATE); culture (value rather than a priority); 
breadth of stakeholder engagement; effective communication. However, during the exercise 
with the panel members these have been reduced to four crosscutting influencers and will be 
discussed in more detail in section 3.1, as it was deemed critical to keep the model as 
simple as possible, without reducing its meaningfulness.  
The analysis of the holes also reveals complex links between lines of defence, when the 
increase or decrease in one hole may intentionally or unintentionally increase or decrease 
other holes (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Conceptual interdependencies that demonstrate a non-linear relationship between the lines of defence 
2.2 Gaps in the model 
The academic exercise revealed further gaps in the model. It was agreed in the expert 
workshop that these cannot be added to the layers of defence, but should be considered 
when thinking about a broader context within which a failure may occur:  
- Lack of explicit multi-hazard consideration: current layers of defence do not consider 
an occurrence of two or more hazards/ threats happening at the same time. Often 
addressing different hazards and threats requires different measures – some of which 
may be conflicting (i.e. solutions to one problem can lead to further unforeseen 
problems).  
- Lack of holistic consideration of risks: the model is theoretical and thus does not 
explain how it can be implemented in a specific context, where it is critical to identify 
vulnerability of what and vulnerability to what that needs reducing. 
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- Lack of consideration of the impact that governance (in its broadest sense) has on 
systemic failure: policy adjacency and the overall national policy framework (and rapid 
changes in it) 
- Complexity of infrastructure assets: different ownership, different scale of operation, 
different governance  
- Engagement with wider range of stakeholders, other professional bodies and non-
members 
- Post-incident response, including reactions to an incident: whilst most of the post-
incident response strategies are most likely to be kept confidential, it is critical to point 
out the importance of carrying out post-incident evaluation, in order to build back better. 
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3. Suggested changes 
 
3.1 Crosscutting influencers 
Through the exercise with the ICE panel members, four crosscutting influencers (i.e. factors 
that could affect every line of defence, positively or negatively) were confirmed; these 
include: 
- Understanding of risks, including the perception of risks; 
- Culture, making risk assessment value rather than a priority; 
- Effective communication among the widest range of stakeholders; 
- Politics and legislation (national and international political actions that may affect 
project’s operation and maintenance, depending on budget cuts, ownership etc.):  
o most of the issues are systemic yet government decisions often affect the size of 
the holes regardless of the actions of the industry. The consideration of the 
model thus should be caveated in a way that includes policy, government 
decision and pressures from central government).  
Crosscutting influences could be visualised as ‘knock-out’ holes in a 13amp electrical back-
box (Figure 4); they are the ‘threads’ that run through all the plates. Good or bad thread 
practice will affect all plates in some way, in addition to lines of defence specific holes. The 
crosscutting influences can be seen as negative (‘genetic vulnerabilities’ that, if triggered, 
create holes in all lines of defence) and positive (‘golden threads’ that, if addressed, fill in 
some of the holes in all lines of defence). Following the logic of the Swiss Cheese Model and 
as demonstrated in Figure 4, some of the crosscutting issues will open and some will remain 
closed. However, in practise the holes can be partially open and may change their size as 
well as move randomly.  
 
 Figure 4 Visual representation of crosscutting influencers on the lines of defence as ‘knock-out holes’ 
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3.2 Post-incident phase  
It is suggested that post-incident considerations should be included in the model once the 
lines of defence are explored, by partially adapting the bowtie model (section 2). The post-
incident phase covers consideration of responses immediately after an incident (and how an 
incident is handled), longer-term responses to an incident as well as mitigating strategies 
that could reduce the potential impact of an incident, and the future preventative strategies. 
This phase does not provide specific responses but instead encourages consideration of 
how to build back better. The bow-tie idea of post-incident response aids the understanding 
of ‘what can people do (or set up) before the project or before the incident to minimise the 
fall-out if the incident occurs’.  
3.3 Setting the risk assessment context: resilience audit  
More holistic approach to working through the model can be supported by the international 
risk management standard ISO 31000 ‘Risk management – Principles and guidelines 
‘(British Standards Institution, 2009; 2011) presents four stages, those being risk 
identification, assessment, evaluation, and treatment. It is however suggested that the 
‘treatment’ stage should be expanded into two stages, to aid end users to ‘identify’ what 
measures can be used, and to ‘prioritise’ them in relation to their effectiveness (see Bosher, 
2014). The five key stages of such framework are detailed in Table 2 and should be 
considered prior to working through the lines of defence. Table 3 presents a checklist (and 
an example) that could be used to carry out a resilience audit; this can be carried out for a 
project as a whole or for each line of defence and each hole separately.  
Understanding the potential impacts and likelihoods of vulnerabilities occurring lead to 
understanding the overall risks, therefore aiding the prioritisation of the risk reduction 
measures. For instance, it has been suggested by the members of the board that Lines 2.3 
(SQEP) and 3.4 (Asset stewardship of infrastructure) should be considered as priority as 
they may set holes for other lines; this however is context specific and may change 
depending on a project.  
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Table 2 Detailed contents of the ISR Framework (Bosher 2014 after Mansfield et al. 1996) 
Stage Descriptor 
1 Identify, characterize, and 
assess hazards/threats 
Hazard/Threat identification – the process of finding, recognising and describing hazards/threats to which the space is 
exposed.  
Hazard/Threat identification involves the identification of: 
• Type of hazard/threat  
• The events/circumstances when the hazard/threat is prevalent 
• Their causes  
• Their potential consequences  
It involves:  
• Assessing historical data,  
• seeking informed and expert opinions, and 
• understanding stakeholders’ needs. 
2 Assess the vulnerability to 
specific hazards/threats 
Vulnerability assessment is the process of assessing the susceptibility of the intrinsic properties (the structure, materials, 
construction, planning etc.) to a hazard/threat that can lead to an event with a consequence 
3 Determine the risk (i.e. the 
expected consequences of 
specific hazards/threats on 
specific assets) 
Identifying the level of risk - magnitude of a risk or combination of risks, expressed in terms of the combination of the 
likelihood (chance of something happening) and the impact (consequences) of an incident caused by that hazard/threat. 
It utilises a Risk Matrix as a tool for ranking and displaying risks by defining ranges for consequence and likelihood  
4 Identify ways to reduce those 
risks (i.e. reduce the size of a 
hole) 
1. Inherent safety – eliminate the possibility 
of hazards/threats occurring 
2. Prevention – reduce the likelihood of 
hazards/threats 
3. Detection – measures for early warning of 
hazards/threats 
4. Control – limiting the size of the 
hazards/threats 
5. Mitigation and adaptation – protection 
from the effects of hazards/threats 
6. Emergency response – planning for 
evacuation and access for emergency 
services 
Identifying (and prioritising) a course of action to address and treat the 
hazard/threat and its associated risks. Treatment can involve: 
• avoiding the risk by deciding not to start or continue with the activity 
that gives rise to the risk; 
• removing the hazard/threat source; 
• changing the likelihood or magnitude; 
• changing the consequences;  
• protecting assets/spaces from the effects of the risk 
• preparedness planning for the impacts of risks (events) 
• sharing the risk with another party or parties [including contracts and 
risk financing]; and 
• retaining the risk by informed decision making 
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Table 3 Resilience audit with an example developed during the expert workshop 
Line of 
defence 
Holes  Potential 
impact of a 
vulnerability 
Likelihood of 
the 
vulnerability 
appearing 
Risk of a 
hole 
occurring 
Ways of 
reducing 
vulnerability 
(examples) 
1 to 5, with 1 = lowest impact 
and 5 = highest 
2.
2 
At
te
nt
io
n 
to
 q
ua
lit
y 
in
 d
es
ig
n 
an
d 
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n 
Lack of systematic 
application of the concept 
of inherent safety 
5 1 Low CPD 
Lack of safe-life  5 2 Low  
Lack of fail-safe 5 2 Low Technology 
Poor quality construction 5 4 High Incentives 
Poor quality maintenance  5 4 High  
Focus on personal safety 
but not on quality on site  
It was decided that this hole is not clearly defined in the 
interim report and should not be evaluated  
Tolerance to incidences of 
errors  
5 4 High Culture, 
incentives 
Tolerance of incidences of 
defects 
5 4 High Culture, CPD 
Organisational culture and 
attitudes towards quality  
5 3 Medium CPD, SQEP 
Complex supply chains 5 3 Medium  
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4. Summary of the proposed changes to the model and recommendations 
The proposed model is presented in Figure 5. It displays the links between the potential 
causes, vulnerabilities, preventative and mitigative controls and consequences of a major 
incident. The model does not find the answers but emphasises what is known but is not used 
and what is not known – and thus where the vulnerabilities are likely to make bigger ‘holes’ 
and lead to failures. 
 
 
Figure 5 Proposed changed to the Lines of Defence: introducing holistic risk assessment, crosscutting 
influencers, and post-incident response 
The proposed changes reflect the importance of understanding the overall risk context, 
crosscutting influences that may affect every line of defence, and post-incident response. In 
an ideal world, all the information would be available to proceed with the model, but in reality, 
informed guesses and trade-offs will have to be made. It is also crucial to consider broader 
societal and policy contexts when considering the model. It is however important to point out 
that this model presents a process that should be thought through on a regular basis, rather 
than treated as an end point, due to the changeable nature of the holes and influencers. 
The following recommendations are proposed for the inclusion in the final report to make the 
model more accessible and effective for non-experts and those without specific/ prior 
knowledge of the industry: 
1. Highlight that the model should be considered throughout a lifetime of a project 
(rather than as a one-off exercise) as depending on a changing context (e.g. 
ageing infrastructure) the holes in the lines of defence will also change; the model 
represents a process rather than an end point.  
2. Define the terminology used in the report to avoid misinterpretation of the holes 
(e.g. safe-life; self-certification), and extend definitions where appropriate (e.g. 
‘false self-certification’ and ‘well-intentioned self-certification’) 
Academic analysis – Report 
4th June 2018  
15 
 
3. Highlight the limitations of the Swiss Cheese Model, in particular its linearity that 
does not allow reflecting complexity and interdependencies of and among the 
lines of defence.  
4. Explore whether prioiritisation of the lines of defence is important and should be 
considered.  
5. Consider which stakeholders (i.e. any persons with an interest or concern in a 
project) may provide relevant information 
6. Assess the risks holistically, prior to identifying and reducing the holes in each 
line of defence 
7. Explore potential tensions (will filling in one hole create other holes?) and 
synergies (will filling in one hole close other holes?) when considering risk 
reduction measures 
8. Include post-incident considerations.  
Although purely conceptual, the 12 Lines of Defence model enables considering lessons 
learned and highlighting the importance of larger societal context. It emphasises that lines of 
defence – and holes – are interconnected and interdepended.  
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Conclusion 
This report presented an academic evaluation of the applicability and validity of the ICE’s 12 
Lines of Defence model. The report concludes that the adaption of Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
Model as a basis of the Lines of Defence is appropriate, as it is well recognised and 
understood by a wide range of stakeholders. Notwithstanding, we have proposed an 
integration of post-incident analysis, appreciation for crosscutting influencers that could 
positively or negatively impact every line of defence, and a general risk management 
framework to be included in the model in order to increase and extend the reach of the 
model, without compromising its recognition and effectiveness. Clarifications on the 
limitations of the model, terminology used in the model and its applicability (i.e. consideration 
throughout the lifetime of the project) were also proposed.  
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APPENDIX A 
ICE In Plain Sight – academic validation exercise  
In this exercise, you will be required to consider whether the 
cross-cutting issues, suggested by Loughborough University 
are truly cross-cutting. Overarching vulnerabilities are like 
‘knock-out’ holes in a 13amp electrical back-box; they are 
the ‘threads’ that run through all the plates. Good or bad 
thread practice will affect all plates in some way. The cross-
cutting issues can be seen as negative (‘genetic 
vulnerabilities’ that, if triggered, create holed in all lines of 
defence) and positive (‘golden threads’ that, if addressed, fill 
in the holes in all lines of defence).  
The aim of the exercise is to understand whether the model 
supports holistic considerations that could help preventing 
the failure. The model does not find the answer but to 
emphasise what is known but is not used and what is not 
known – and thus where the vulnerabilities are likely to 
make ‘bigger holes’ and lead to failures. Whilst the exercise 
may seem long, you should not spend much time on it: 
please rely on your intelligent guess but highlight where the information is not easily available. Also consider where the information could be 
found.  
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The task 
Choose an incident: 
- Piper Alpha 
- Buncefield 
- Edinburgh schools 
Using the information about the chosen incident (available in Appendix D and Appendix E of review of the In Plain Sight working group reports), 
map out (i.e. answer yes or no) the known and unknown information for the overarching vulnerabilities in the following table (based on the 
information that is easily accessible/ available + intelligent guess).  
Cross-cutting 
vulnerabilities 
Would this vulnerability 
create a hole in every line 
of defence (that are not 
cross-cutting)? 
Was this vulnerability 
known before the incident 
Has this 
vulnerability 
become known 
after the incident? 
If  was not known, how to 
check that it exists (e.g. 
who would you need to talk 
to, what kind of information 
would you need)?  
Understanding of risk     
Asset handover 
 
    
SKATE (skills, 
knowledge, attitude, 
training and experience) 
    
Culture (value rather 
than priority) 
    
Breadth of stakeholder 
engagement  
 
    
Effective 
communication 
    
 
